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It should be obvious that, within the conﬁ nes of a short response, we 
cannot possibly answer the question that constitutes the title of our reply. 
Nonetheless, each of our commentators touched upon issues that bear 
directly on this question, so we’ve chosen it as a framework within which 
to reﬂ ect upon their many stimulating comments.
Naturalism in moral philosophy is associated with diverse views that do 
not make up a happy family. At the turn of the twentieth century, G. E. 
Moore’s Principia Ethica outlined a (purportedly fallacious) metaethical 
view that came to be known as “moral naturalism.” According to Moore, 
this particular form of naturalism is committed to the view that moral 
properties are natural properties and can therefore be deﬁ ned as such. 
Deﬁ nitions provide analyses in terms of necessary and sufﬁ cient condi-
tions; that is, they are analytic. Such analytic deﬁ nitions do not leave open 
any questions about the relationship between the deﬁ nition and what is 
deﬁ ned. However, Moore claimed, all attempts to deﬁ ne the moral do allow 
for such open questions. Therefore, moral naturalism is false. In addition, 
the term is also used to denote a claim that natural facts can vindicate, 
justify, or ground moral facts in a strong sense. Now, the view we outline 
is, by our lights, ethically naturalistic. However, we believe neither in the 
reducibility of the moral to the descriptive nor in the vindication of the 
moral by the descriptive. We do, of course, believe that moral norms, ends, 
and values are amenable to rational discussion. But the strong sense of 
vindication—the demonstrative sort that Hume correctly saw as not in the 
ofﬁ ng—is something we reject. Thus, given the multifarious uses of the 
term “ethical naturalism” or “moral naturalism,” it is not surprising that 
our commentators (naturalists themselves) would hold some beliefs differ-
ent than our own.
For example, Michael Ruse believes (as J. L. Mackie did) that ethics 
requires a strong form of rationally compelling, objective categoricity, and 
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since this notion is now incredible, the upshot is skepticism. We, too, reject 
this notion of categoricity but replace it with a naturalized version that 
does not lead to skepticism. After all, why think that morality would or 
should bind rational beings, wherever they may be? On our view, this 
conception is an artifact of one particular tradition of morality, which 
maintains that moral judgments and imperatives must have objective 
categorical prescriptive force, or else they are not moral at all. There are 
many naturalists who maintain this feature to be a necessary (perhaps 
conceptual) truth about morality; without it, morality is a ﬁ ction, a myth, 
an error.1 But what, precisely, is this error? Is it that our concept of moral-
ity has no referent? Or that one particular conception of morality got 
things wrong and should be replaced by another? Any naturalistic geneal-
ogy of morals (including values, virtues, and norms) will reveal them as 
resulting from contingent biological and cultural processes, and it is 
entirely apt to claim, as Ruse does, that none of the imperatives of moral-
ity need bind all other rational beings, wherever they may be (and what-
ever that might entail). Instead, we claim that the imperatives of morality 
pertain to our particular species, and not to any larger, more inclusive set 
of “rational” beings, of which we comprise some part. As an “intergalactic 
relativist,” we believe Ruse would agree, and as a “terrestrial relativist,” we 
believe he has no need to be a skeptic in any radical sense. In denying that 
morality consists in self-certifying rational a priori truths (or deductions 
from such truths), one need not deny that there are sensible, rational ways 
of endorsing ends and means. These ways would be inductive and abduc-
tive, but this should not engender skepticism in any strong sense.2
William Casebeer’s comments concerning the implications of the col-
lapse of the analytic/synthetic distinction are helpful here and should 
make any naturalist uncomfortable in thinking that any thick concept 
such as morality would include a feature such as “binding on all rational 
beings” as a necessary conceptual truth. To borrow some of his language, 
why not say that instead of conceptual truths concerning morality, we have 
an evolving theory of morality, and that the proper way to investigate and 
evaluate this theory is to see how it coheres with other theories in the 
empirical and social sciences and with our experience of morality as found 
in history, literature, and phenomenology? We can characterize elements 
or features of morality, but Quinean criticisms and the work of cognitive 
linguists give us reason not to expect analytic deﬁ nitions for most interest-
ing terms outside of formal sciences. Thus, it turns out that Moore was 
right: questions will remain open when we want to “deﬁ ne” morality. But 
that’s precisely what we should expect with synthetic “deﬁ nitions,” which 
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are more akin to characterizations that try to isolate core or essential prop-
erties of a term and so rarely claim to be exhaustive or fully reductive.
One might wonder whether, by scuttling the strong objective prescriptiv-
ity of morality and its ties with rationality, we are throwing the moral baby 
out with the bathwater? Not at all. We believe there is a naturalistic story 
that not only captures the insights of the outdated conception mentioned 
above but also shows why the old conception got things wrong in the ﬁ rst 
place. For example, as Peter Railton notes, in practice, moral imperatives 
and judgments are often exchanged in particular contexts which include 
tacit background assumptions and qualiﬁ cations. Indeed, they can be 
stated categorically only if we assume such a contextual framework. Of 
course, we could include all the possible exceptions and qualiﬁ cations 
within the imperatives themselves, but that would assume a small or man-
ageable ﬁ nite set of such qualiﬁ cations and exceptions, as well as a way to 
efﬁ ciently deploy them. Both of these claims are contentious; the former 
would be impossibly cumbersome (to use Railton’s turn of phrase), the 
latter cognitively onerous. Hence, as a matter of practical usage, the imper-
atives of morality are often explicitly categorical; as regards their logical 
status, they are implicitly hypothetical, contingent on features arising in 
their application.
It is true that moral judgments and imperatives elicit strong reactions in 
individuals and are felt to be particularly compelling. It is also true that 
moral imperatives are often stated categorically, especially to the morally 
immature (though it is an interesting question to what extent moral judg-
ments and imperatives are stated categorically by mature agents in every-
day discourse). These facts arising out of moral phenomenology and 
practice might explain how one particular conception of morality might 
have seemed so cogent (namely, the one that claims for it objective cate-
gorical prescriptions binding all rational beings). They do not, however, 
render morality a sham.
Moral imperatives and judgments can guide action and motivate indi-
viduals not because of anything internal to their syntax, semantics, or 
logical structure, still less because our biology makes us think that they 
refer to something objective (as Ruse claims),3 but rather because of how 
they relate to vital human needs, desires, and interests, such as a need for 
safety, security, friendship, reciprocity, and a sense of belonging. This 
affords an understanding of their “practical clout.”4 Without these contin-
gent facts about the species Homo sapiens, morality would be inert. Railton 
describes the connection between moral language and motivation as one 
of regular implication, not logical entailment. Without such a regular 
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connection, “moral language could have no ‘special action-guiding force’ 
or give rise to interpersonal expectations” (p. 42). We ﬁ nd this way of 
parsing our position agreeable.
Additionally, moral language is not merely a laundry list of acceptable 
and deplorable actions, and moral imperatives do not simply justify certain 
behaviors and proscribe others. Rather, they work to encourage members 
of a community to adopt a certain perspective, to shape their preexisting 
desires and interests in such a way as to make them conducive to moral 
ends.5 In this way, some moral judgments and imperatives (in particular, 
the most important ones) have to be external to any particular agent and 
are applied to particular agents regardless of their own motivations, desires, 
and beliefs. If they succeed in this role, it is not because of a special force 
they exercise on rational beings but because they relate to needs and desires 
most members of our species hold dear and most have an interest in pro-
moting.6 Moral reasons are thus often (and rightly) presented as being in 
the interests of those on whom they are being urged. In other words, when 
we examine the way moral concepts and imperatives are deployed in social 
lives, and when we understand the vital functional role they play in 
forging our desires, we can then understand the special status many have 
claimed for morality without having to set apart moral language as having 
peculiar qualities on its own.7
This naturalistic developmental model helps us see morality as a func-
tional system that aims to shape multifarious and inchoate desires (both 
self- and other-regarding), not merely sanction or vindicate them. Morality 
“works” because it answers to these deep-seated-yet-contingent interests 
and desires of humans. Indeed, their very biological and cultural contin-
gency allows for the fact that, as our drives are shaped by the ecological 
niches we construct and the selective pressure we thereby bring upon 
ourselves, morality—this functional mechanism for dealing with intraper-
sonal and interpersonal conﬂ ict—will change along with it. Natural phe-
nomena do not justify normative ethics, but they surely feed into this 
justiﬁ cation—even while it must take place within a normative framework 
(not reducible to a descriptive one).
An interesting question remains. We claim that moral statements are 
truth apt, and that many of them will turn out to be true. What kinds of 
truths do these consist in? This is a complicated question, and we cannot 
do it full justice in this instance. Nonetheless, there are a number of factors 
to consider.
For example, does moral variety result from an interplay of human 
interests, needs, and desires with a particular socioecological context? On 
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one view, supported by relationalists, the answer is “yes.” As individuals 
and environments differ, their interests will too. For any particular indi-
vidual, we might say that there are objective facts concerning her best 
interests. What are these? They are what she would want in “ideal epistemic 
conditions,” that is, with full information about her relevant capacities, 
history, and genes, her psychological and physical constitution, and so 
forth. Given these considerations, it is easy to see how and why an indi-
vidual’s objective interests will be ﬁ tting for her and not others. On a 
relational view, this can be understood as standard ecological variation. 
Similarly, if individuals are alike in most ways and if their niches align, 
then they will agree on most things.
In any event, we must assume that most people have at least some ten-
dencies towards their own good; minimally, people must want some good 
things some of the time. Moreover, as noted above, these wants must be 
amenable to the general constraints of cooperative activity. In addition to 
these evolutionary constraints, we have theories, traditions, putative 
authorities, and other resources to help us work out intrapersonal and 
interpersonal tensions. With the relevant information, reasoning skills, 
and patience, we can arrive at objective values and truths (deploying a very 
unobjectionable notion of truth). This is possible on a relational model.
However, what happens when things break down, when disagreement 
endures? How is one to determine which side is correct? Imagine two 
individuals in a moral dispute. The dispute need not be grave, but let’s 
suppose that they judge it worthy of sustained discussion. Let’s further 
suppose (to make things advantageous to an amenable outcome) that the 
dispute involves persons otherwise well disposed to one another, who will 
be curious, sincere, and willing to expose themselves to risk, all of which 
are generally necessary to resolving moral disputes. So investigations are 
made, questions are answered (hopefully in good faith), authorities are 
cited, reasons are exhausted, and appeals fail to gain assent. Disagreement 
persists. How to understand this? We believe we can understand how this 
can happen, and happen regularly, by looking at an important component 
common to moral traditions.
Take, as an example, a Confucian community, wherein the preservation 
of certain relationships embodied in an ideal of social harmony would be 
very high in determining what the true moral duties are in that commu-
nity. This kind of morality can satisfy and coordinate the intrapersonal 
and interpersonal needs, interests, and purposes of its members. All 
the same, such a morality will differ substantially from that of another 
community, which emphasizes the rights of the individual and the 
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preservation of individual autonomy more than social harmony. This latter 
type of morality can also meet the functional requirements of satisfying 
and coordinating the needs, interests, and purposes of its own members. 
However, in both cases, part of what affords their functionality is the way 
these moralities rule one another out; indeed, moralities can only work 
effectively by so ruling out several possible moral options, which cannot 
all be included without rendering morality’s “action-guiding-ness” impo-
tent. When fundamental ends are prioritized in a certain way, there will 
be more or less sensible or efﬁ cient ways of conﬁ guring moral codes to 
meet those ends. Indeed, some such conﬁ gurations will be inapt. Hence, 
the moral truths of one community will be relative to it in the sense that 
other moralities and other conﬁ gurations of moral codes will be ruled out 
for it (even while being acceptable from the standpoint of the functional 
requirement).8 Considerations of morality’s functional role, together with 
facts about human nature, constrain only so much. A great many options 
will remain viable, as the very ways in which moral communities evolve—
by responding and adapting to technological innovation, political change, 
climate change, interactions with other cultures, and so forth—lead to 
great contingent variation.9 In ascertaining how a Confucian moral com-
munity would come to have different priorities compared to a Western 
one, examining the particular ecological niche will tell us a great deal. 
However, it cannot tell us why these norms are correct; they are correct 
not in virtue of meeting the functional requirement in a niche-speciﬁ c way 
but in how they ﬁ gure in moral systems, systems that meet this functional 
requirement while ruling other options out. In a sense, moral truth has to 
be relative; when everything is acceptable, nothing is action-guiding.
A relational analysis is vital to understanding certain common features 
of moral systems, and some moral facts might be as straightforwardly 
relational as atmospheric oxygen’s being poisonous to anaerobic bacteria.10 
Our view therefore includes relationalism as a good explanation for some 
similarities and variations among moral imperatives across societies. 
Nevertheless, even while all true moralities will fulﬁ ll the functional 
requirement, and even while the moral concepts of different moral tradi-
tions will overlap to a signiﬁ cant degree, some aspects of particular moral-
ities, including important variations in fundamental moral ends (such as 
those pertaining to social harmony versus greater individual autonomy 
outlined above), will be true only relative to those moralities and not 
others. These considerations concerning the justiﬁ cation of practical moral 
judgments and particular moral codes represent, to our mind, the real 
sticking point between relationalism and relativism.
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Finally, what of tolerance? Moral disagreement can certainly be trou-
bling. However, even when sincere investigation and dialogue yield no 
single verdict owing to fundamental variation in moral ends (and imper-
fect means of achieving those ends), this need not have any deleterious 
effects. Tolerance itself can be a moral end of many traditions, as can 
cognate notions such as acceptance, accommodation, forgiveness, or ﬂ ex-
ibility. Among a tradition’s moral resources might be heroes or saints who 
were able to forge cooperation, even ﬂ ourishing, in the face of serious 
disagreement. In any case, these are contingent matters. There is no guar-
antee that, even given exceptionally forgiving moral systems and excep-
tionally sincere moral discussions, substantive agreement will follow. 
Nevertheless, solutions can be made agreeable. And when strategies line up, 
the natural upshot can be a healthy, tolerant relativism.
Both relationalists and relativists can be pluralists and recognize a wide 
range of true (or justiﬁ ed) moralities, and naturalists of these stripes can 
understand certain features to be common (perhaps universal) across true 
moralities owing to the way they relate to human nature and owing to 
constraints arising from the circumstances of social coordination. Which 
of these approaches best captures the variation of moral traditions among 
our species and the nature of moral truth? We ascribe to much of what 
relationalism holds, but we believe a relational analysis can’t take us all 
the way, that the truths of moral systems are underdetermined by a rela-
tional analysis. Our brand of relativism can embrace this underdetermina-
tion, owing to an understanding of a characteristic component of moral 
systems in general and how it works to determine what is true for any 
moral system in particular. Relationalism cannot.
Notes
1. Prominent contemporary error theorists include Richard Joyce, Michael Ruse, and 
Tamler Sommers and Alex Rosenberg, all of them naturalists. J. L. Mackie, while not an 
obvious choice for a naturalist, is the modern patriarch for this philosophical lineage.
2. Much of engineering, for example, consists of inductive and abductive reasoning, 
but no one seriously doubts that there are better and worse ways to build bridges, 
and so forth.
3. Ruse (p. 36). More on this issue below.
4. We borrow this phrase from Richard Joyce (2006).
5. For these reasons, we deny what Ruse claims in this regard—namely, that “biology 
trumps philosophy” (p. 36). Ruse claims, ﬁ rst, that we have a “biological” tendency 
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to objectify morality or a biological tendency to understand moral statements as 
having objective referents; second, that without this biological tendency, “our sub-
stantive ethics would break down” (p. 36); third, that this tendency provides us with 
powerful dispositions towards moral ends; and fourth, that this biological tendency 
cannot be trumped by “philosophical knowledge” that moral statements in fact lack 
objective referents. In other words, evolution selected for an overpowering tendency 
to objectify morality, and this explains the prescriptive force of moral claims. As it 
stands, this account runs contrary to much of human moral development, which 
is accomplished through a communal process of cultivating individuals’ promoral 
tendencies (no easy task on its own) while reworking many other, equally natural 
and powerful tendencies orthogonal or antagonistic to moral ends. These other 
tendencies, such as those towards self-preservation, personal advantage, or even 
reproduction, must be made compatible with (or amenable to) moral ends. If biology 
provided strong, trumping promoral dispositions, then coordinating means and 
ends would not be so notoriously difﬁ cult. We recognize this difﬁ culty and so deny 
that “biology trumps” in any interesting or deep sense. Our account (outlined 
below) allows us to understand the “force” of moral imperatives while eschewing 
such speculation.
6. This, in spite of the undeniable polymorphism of psychological traits among 
human beings.
7. Incidentally, Railton classiﬁ es Simon Blackburn and Alan Gibbard as non-
naturalists, whereas by our lights, and given our methodological commitments, they 
would qualify as naturalists.
8. For more on this aspect of morality, see Wong (2006b).
9. Compare with the “Principle of Minimal Psychological Realism” (Flanagan, 
1991): “Make sure when constructing a moral theory or projecting a moral idea that 
the character, decision processing, and behavior prescribed are possible, or are per-
ceived to be possible, for creatures like us” (p. 32). This both describes a feature 
common to many moralities and prescribes a standard of evaluation. However, a 
great variety of moral traditions can meet this standard of psychological realizabil-
ity. In other words, it does not rule out that much. The same might be said for 
socioecological constraints: they do provide real criteria for evaluation, but they 
leave much in play.
10. Railton (p. 43).
